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Abstract 
Recent research on the differentiated MNC has concerned knowledge  flows between MNC 
units.  While linking up with this literature, we extend in two directions. First, we argue that 
conceptualizing the MNC as a knowledge structure furthers the understanding of intra-MNC 
knowledge flows. Thus, we see MNC knowledge elements as being structured along such 
dimensions as their type and degree of complementarity to other knowledge elements, and their 
sources, for example, whether they are mainly developed from external or internal knowledge 
sources.  These dimensions matter in terms of knowledge flows, because they influence the 
costs and benefits of knowledge transfer and, hence, the actual level of knowledge transferred. 
Second, based on this conceptualization, we argue that MNC management can influence the 
development, characteristics and transfer of knowledge through choices regarding 
organizational instruments (control, motivation and context).  We test six hypotheses derived 
from these arguments against a unique dataset on subsidiary knowledge development.  The 
dataset includes  information on organizational instruments, sources of subsidiary knowledge, 
and the extent of knowledge transfer to other MNC units.  It covers more than 2,000 
subsidiaries located in seven different European countries. 
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I. Introduction 
In spite of the present popularity of knowledge-based approaches, we are still 
lacking an adequate theoretical and empirical understanding of many of the 
causal mechanisms and contextual factors in relations among knowledge, 
learning, and competitive advantage (MacEvily and Chakravarthy 2002).  We see 
two main, closely related, causes of this relative ignorance. First, the main 
emphasis   particularly in the strategy literature  has been on inter-firm 
knowledge heterogeneity rather than on intra-firm knowledge heterogeneity.   
Comparatively little research has been devoted to understanding the ways in 
which knowledge may be stratified, distributed, partly overlapping, 
complementary or, in another word, structured i n s i d e  f i r m s .   S e c o n d ,  l i t t l e  
attention has been paid to how internal organizations interact with the creation 
and use of knowledge.    
   Recent work on the differentiated multinational corporation (MNC) is very 
concerned with knowledge flows between MNC units and often explicitly 
considers the role of organizational instruments in the process of knowledge 
transfer (e.g., Hedlund 1986; Bartlett and Ghoshal 1986, 1989; Birkinshaw 1996; 
Gupta and Govindarajan 1991, 1995, 2000; Holm and Pedersen 2000a). However, 
even this literature is still in the early stages of understanding the central aspects, 
mechanisms, and contextual factors in the process of managing knowledge in 
MNCs.  Progress on these matters is arguably handicapped by the absence of a 
consistent conceptualization of the MNC as a knowledge-based entity that 
stresses intra-firm heterogeneity, as well as the interaction of internal 
organization, knowledge creation and knowledge use.   The present paper seeks 
to remedy some of these weaknesses by theorizing neglected aspects of MNC 
knowledge management.  
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  We begin by offering a conceptual development of the notion of an MNC’s 
knowledge structure. This structure may be dimensionalized in terms of, for 
example, dispersal, complexity, tacitness, complementarity, and sources of 
knowledge elements.  Some of these dimensions, notably tacitness and 
complexity, have already been addressed in the literature, (e.g., Zander and 
Kogut 1995).   We therefore focus on more neglected knowledge structure 
dimensions:  complementarity between and sources of knowledge elements.   
Processes of managing knowledge within the overall MNC network take place in 
the context of the MNC knowledge structure, making this structure an important 
determinant of the costs and benefits of such processes. The implication is that 
costs and benefits of MNC knowledge transfer can only be fully understood in the 
context of the MNC knowledge structure. The manner in which knowledge is 
structured in the MNC (e.g. sources and complementarity of knowledge) matters 
to the flow of knowledge among MNC-units, although this aspect has been 
largely neglected in the literature.  
  We then discuss how the MNC knowledge structure may be influenced by 
management decisions.  First, we consider organizational instruments, such as 
decisions that influence relations between subsidiaries or between subsidiaries 
and the center. Second, we consider the sources of knowledge that subsidiaries tap 
as something that MNC management can influence.   Specifically, we distinguish 
between knowledge sourced internally from the subsidiary and the MNC 
network, and knowledge sourced externally from network relations and local 
clusters.  These sources matter to MNC knowledge management because 
knowledge tapped from different sources differs, for example, in terms of 
tacitness or complexity. Therefore, the costs and benefits of knowledge transfer 
are influenced by the source. Third, for the reasons just given, management will 
seek to influence the utilization of diverse knowledge sources through 
organizational instruments.   
    We derive six hypotheses from these arguments and test them against a 
unique dataset on subsidiary knowledge development that includes information 
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on the organizational setting, sources of subsidiary knowledge and the extent of 
knowledge transfer to other MNC units.    
  In sum, this paper contributes to the extant literature on the differentiated 
MNC in a number of ways.  First, steps are taken towards a conceptualization of 
the MNC as a knowledge structure.  Second, some important dimensions of this 
knowledge structure are developed - the complementarity and sources of 
knowledge elements.  Third, we argue that a knowledge structure 
conceptualization furthers the understanding of MNC knowledge transfer, 
because this conceptualization directs attention to the costs and benefits of 
knowledge transfer.  Fourth, we argue that an important part of MNC knowledge 
management influencing the knowledge sourcing that MNC units undertake.   
Fifth, we develop and test hypotheses on this basis.   
II. Theoretical Model and Hypotheses 
Background 
  Knowledge and learning are at the root of understanding how competitive 
advantage is gained and sustained. This statement has become almost axiomatic 
in recent literature. The “knowledge-based view” of the firm encapsulates this 
observation (e.g., Kogut and Zander 1992; Grant 1996).  However, much of the 
extant work has been conducted on a very high level of abstraction or aggregation 
that excludes the finer details of organizational and knowledge structures inside 
firms (i.e., intra-firm knowledge heterogeneity) (but see, e.g., Hansen 1999).  
  Arguably, this has some unfortunate consequences, of which three are 
considered here.  First, much of the literature assumes that, whereas knowledge is 
very costly to transfer across markets, it is transferable at close to zero cost inside 
firms.  Thus, the prominent argument that firm boundaries are shaped by 
capabilities  (e.g., Kogut and Zander 1992) reflects an underlying claim that 
knowledge is (much) less costly to transfer inside firms than between firms.     
While such a claim should be treated as an empirical hypothesis rather than as a 
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starting point for analysis, the claim easily arises when intra-firm knowledge 
heterogeneity is suppressed and emphasis is placed on inter-firm heterogeneity.  
Second, a further consequence of suppressing intra-firm knowledge heterogeneity 
is that intra-firm learning becomes difficult to frame.  As Kogut and Zander (1992) 
rightly argue, any theory of (organizational) learning requires an underlying 
theory of (organizational) knowledge.  However, to the extent that the relevant 
theory of organizational knowledge abstracts from intra-firm knowledge 
heterogeneity, organizational learning cannot be understood in terms of changes 
to the knowledge structure inside firms.  Third, the costs and benefits of 
knowledge transfer are hard to ascertain in lieu of a theory of intra-firm 
knowledge heterogeneity. This is because the motive for knowledge transfer is 
usually the wish to combine knowledge elements that have hitherto existed 
separately, and because the difficulties of knowledge transfer are at least partly 
related to the specific characteristics of the knowledge at both the sending and 
receiving organizational units.    
  Similar critiques may be directed against recent literature on the 
differentiated MNC, which attempts to concentrate on knowledge flows, 
abstracting from the composition of knowledge elements (i.e., stocks) across the 
MNC network (i.e., the MNC knowledge structure) (e.g., Gupta and Govindarajan 
1991, 1995, 2000).  Moreover, despite its concern with knowledge flows, the 
differentiated MNC literature has not made much out of flows from the external 
environment to the subsidiaries, which is a manifestation of a broader neglect of 
the sources of subsidiary knowledge stocks (e.g., local networks, local universities, 
local markets, internal R&D, etc.).  Finally, although the differentiated MNC 
literature has paid attention to the relation between knowledge and organization 
(e.g., Ghoshal, Korine and Szulanski 1994), causality is usually taken to be uni-
directional. The organization of the MNC is seen as reflecting the characteristics of 
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transferred knowledge, whereas the point that this organization may be chosen to 
influence the characteristics of knowledge is seldom seen, if at all.   
  In contrast, we argue that the MNC can indirectly influence the 
characteristics of knowledge, such as the proportion between tacit and explicit 
knowledge in their knowledge structures, by means of organizational 
instruments.  They can do so by influencing the subsidiary choice of knowledge 
sources, because these sources are associated with different mixes of tacit and 
explicit elements.  This is one illustration of the more general point that a greater 
concern with how knowledge elements are structured across the MNC will 
provide a better understanding of MNC knowledge management.   
The MNC as a Knowledge Structure: Some Building Blocks 
  The notion that firms may be understood in terms of knowledge structures 
(and not just knowledge assets) was first explicitly put forward by Lyles and 
Schwenk (1992).  They introduce the notion of an “organizational knowledge 
structure” to refer to shared thoughts at the organizational level about “… goals, 
cause-and-effect beliefs, and other cognitive elements.”  However, firms are 
characterized by a differentiated consensus in these beliefs, so that in the firm’s 
“core” the degree of consensus is high, while in the “periphery” it is low.  They go 
on to dimensionalize the organizational knowledge structure in terms of 
complexity which refers to “… the amount of information … within a knowledge 
structure” (p. 163) and “… the degree to which cognitive units are interrelated” 
(p. 164), and in terms of relatedness, which refers to the degree of coupling (tight 
vs. loose) between elements in the core and periphery of knowledge structures.   
  Knowledge elements. We adopt a broader conceptualization of the 
organizational knowledge structure.  To get an idea of this, think of the overall 
MNC knowledge structure as a set of nodes and their connections.  Then the 
individual nodes refer to knowledge elements such as, for example, a marketing 
capability in a subsidiary in a certain country, or a patent held by the corporate 
center.  Nodes may be identical, as when two subsidiaries exploit the same patent.  
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Lyles and Schwenk’s notion of organizational knowledge structures can be 
represented as the set of identical nodes over subsidiaries and MNC 
headquarters. Nodes may represent tacit or explicit knowledge, or knowledge 
with or without public good character.   
  Characteristics of knowledge elements.   Knowledge elements may possess 
several salient characteristics, such as their tacit knowledge content and their 
complexity.  These characteristics have been extensively discussed in the 
literature (e.g., Winter 1987; Kogut and Zander 1992; Lyles and Schwenk 1992; 
Simonin 1999), to which we add a characteristic that has been comparatively 
neglected - the sources of knowledge elements. 
  Internal and external knowledge sources.  From the perspective of an MNC 
subsidiary, there are two knowledge sources.  Knowledge may come from sources 
that are internal to the MNC and is transferred from other MNC units (i.e., other 
subsidiaries or the Center) or is developed in the subsidiary itself (e.g., through 
R&D, processes of routinization, etc.).  Alternatively, knowledge sources may 
come from external partners (customers, suppliers, etc.) or other agents (e.g., high 
quality research institutions, etc.).   
  Knowledge inputs into the process of building knowledge also differ across 
subsidiaries because subsidiaries confront different knowledge sources.  Some 
subsidiaries may rely relatively more on internal knowledge sources, while others 
may rely more on external ones.  In turn, this will impact the knowledge that is 
built and also influence the costs and benefits of transferring such knowledge.  
Thus, knowledge that is based on internal knowledge sources may be transferable 
at low cost inside the MNC, particularly knowledge which is developed within 
the core of the MNC knowledge structure (i.e., core MNC technologies and 
organizing principles) explicitly as a complement to other knowledge elements in 
the MNC network.   
  Conceptually, one may distinguish between two external sources of 
knowledge that may be available to subsidiary firms.  The first category may be 
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called “network-based knowledge”, the gaining of knowledge from long-lasting 
interaction with specific external parties, such as customers or suppliers, and the 
use of that knowledge in the firm’s activities (Ford 1990; Dyer and Nobeoka 2000). 
The second category may be termed “cluster-based knowledge.” This kind of 
external knowledge is not the result of long-lasting interaction with specific 
parties. Rather, it is based upon knowledge inputs from sources such as a well-
educated work force or local knowledge institutions like technical universities, 
etc. (Porter 1990; Porter and Sölvell 1999).   Here, we treat both categories as one, 
namely as “external knowledge sources.”  
  The distinction between internal and external sources of knowledge is 
different from more conventional activity-based definitions of knowledge, such as 
production, marketing or R&D knowledge.  The latter types may all, in principle, 
have both internal and external components to varying degrees.  An advantage to 
the distinction promoted here is that it may be more plausibly related to the 
(other) characteristics of knowledge discussed earlier than are the activity-based 
definitions of knowledge.  For example, it is hard to argue on apriori grounds that, 
for example, production knowledge is inherently more complex, ambiguous or 
tacit, and therefore harder to transfer, than marketing knowledge. In contrast, this 
type of argument may be more justified with respect to our distinction, although 
this should be done with considerable caution. 
  Knowledge complementarities. If knowledge elements may be understood 
as nodes in a web, there are also connections between those elements.  These 
connections may be understood in terms of lateral or bilateral dependencies. Such 
perceived dependencies underlie intra-MNC knowledge transfers. More refined 
conceptualizations, representations and taxonomies of interdependencies can be 
easily developed (e.g., Thompson 1967: 15-18; Buckley and Carter 1999).  The 
notion of complementarity (Milgrom and Roberts 1990) is particularly helpful for 
conceptualizing interdependencies. Loosely, knowledge elements are 
complementary when there are gains from combining them (the degree of 
complementarity being measured by the size of the gain).  For example, 
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knowledge elements pertaining to marketing controlled by one subsidiary (or the 
MNC headquarters) may be a useful addition to existing marketing knowledge in 
another subsidiary, so that the relevant knowledge elements are additive (Buckley 
and Carter 1999).  Alternatively, subsidiary knowledge may be an input prior to 
the building of knowledge in another part of the MNC, as when knowledge of 
local tastes are transferred to centralized R&D functions, so that the relation of 
complementarity is sequential (ibid.).  Finally, dependencies may go both ways.  
For example, knowledge gained from combined marketing knowledge in a 
number of subsidiaries may be transferred back to these as best practice 
knowledge. Strategies and actions based on knowledge elements in different 
MNC units may be interdependent, requiring coordination (cf. Thompson 1967; 
Buckley and Carter 1999).  
  Determinants of net benefits of knowledge combination. The perceived net 
benefits of combining complementary knowledge elements depend on three 
elements.  First, net benefits depend on the characteristics of the relevant 
knowledge elements: how complementary they are and what kind of 
complementarity is involved, how much tacit knowledge is involved in the 
relevant knowledge elements, how they add to or decrease complexity, etc.   
Second, they depend on the governance costs implied by these characteristics - the 
costs of motivating organization members to transfer and absorb knowledge, and 
coordinate these processes.  Third, net benefits depend on the costs of transfer 
(personal or codified communication, embodied transfer). For example, 
transferring highly tacit knowledge elements under conditions of complex 
complementarity is likely to be very taxing for the organization in terms of 
governance and transfer costs.  The presence of strongly overlapping knowledge 
elements (i.e., shared beliefs in Lyles and Schwenk 1992) may be hypothesized to 
reduce such costs (Kogut and Zander 1992).  
  In sum, MNC knowledge structures may be seen as being composed of 1) 
knowledge elements, which may be characterized in a number of dimensions, 
such as by their sources, and 2) connections between these knowledge elements, 
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which may be conceptualized in terms of complementarities.  Net benefits depend 
on the costs of governing and transferring knowledge in order to realize 
complementarities.   
  This is a simple, but quite flexible framework.  For example, both the 
transfer of existing knowledge and the creation of new knowledge are covered, 
since both may be analyzed as complementarities (i.e., as additive/sequential and 
complex complementarities, respectively). The framework is consistent with, but 
adds to, the basic perspectives of recent work on the differentiated MNC: that 
MNC units control heterogeneous stocks of knowledge, and that the MNC may 
obtain competitive advantages from orchestrating knowledge flows between 
units in such a way that knowledge is transferred to an area where it will increase 
value-added. However, we identify those dimensions along which the MNC 
knowledge structures may be classified.  This allows us to add insight into the 
nature of the decision problem faced by MNC management. 
Developing and Transferring Knowledge as Key Managerial Decision 
Problems 
  Under norms of rationality, MNC management wishes to maximize net 
benefits.  Looking only at knowledge transfer, this translates into maximizing the 
difference between the expected (gross) benefits from transferring knowledge, as 
determined by complementarity, and the expected costs of such transfer, as 
determined by the governance and transfer costs, which in turn is influenced by 
knowledge characteristics such as tacitness, overlap, public good properties, etc.  
This maximization effort is usually cast in terms of choosing those organizational 
arrangements (governance and transfer mechanisms) that minimize the relevant 
costs of undertaking transactions (i.e., transfer) involving knowledge with given 
characteristics (e.g. Kogut and Zander 1993).  The possibility of a reverse 
causality, in which organizational arrangements are chosen so that they influence 
the relevant characteristics, has not previously been investigated.   
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  It has been argued that the MNC owes its existence to its superior ability 
(relative to markets) to transfer knowledge and that this superior ability may, at 
the same time, be a source of competitive advantage relative to purely domestic 
firms (Hedlund 1986).  However, the resource costs of developing and 
transferring knowledge may often be substantial.  According to Kogut and 
Zander (1993: 630) “… these costs are derived from the efforts to codify and 
teaching complex knowledge to recipient” (see also Szulanski 1996).  On the other 
hand, the benefits of transferring knowledge may be substantial, as indicated by, 
for example, Subramaniam and Venkatraman’s (2001), who find that 
transnational product development capability is highly dependent upon the 
transfer of knowledge in MNCs.  
  This suggests that MNC management will do more than maximize net 
benefits from exploiting complementarities between existing MNC knowledge 
elements and choosing those organizational arrangements that minimize the costs 
of transfer and governance.  MNC management will also seek to control the 
determinants of those benefits and costs, and try to influence the characteristics of 
the knowledge elements, such as the sources of subsidiary knowledge.  This main 
argument is summarized in figure 1:  
XXXXXXXX Insert Figure 1 Here XXXXXXXX 
However, rather little is known empirically about the determinants of intra-MNC 
knowledge flows.  Gupta and Govindarajan (2000: 474) observed that, with some 
notable exceptions (e.g., Hamel 1991; Kogut and Zander 1993; Zander and Kogut 
1995; Simonin 1999), “… very little systematic empirical investigation in the 
determinants of intra-MNC knowledge transfers has so far been attempted.” 
Therefore, the following sections consider the knowledge sources of MNC 
subsidiaries and organizational instruments in some detail and discuss their 
implications for the transfer of knowledge in MNCs.   
Knowledge Sources and Knowledge Transfer 
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  As a general matter, impediments to knowledge transfer may be classified as 
either motivational or cognitive barriers  (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Zander and 
Kogut 1995; Gupta and Govindarajan 2000).  In this section, we are primarily 
concerned with cognitive barriers to transfer, reserving motivational factors for 
later treatment.  Cognitive barriers to transfer are usually conceptualized in terms 
of such constructs as causal ambiguity, complexity, tacitness, absorptive capacity, 
and the like.  These variables are difficult to operationalize and measure (but see 
Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Kogut and Zander 1993; Simonin 1999; Gupta and 
Govindarajan 2000).   
  A more operational approach is to start directly from the sources of 
subsidiary knowledge (cf. above) and argue that these sources give rise to 
knowledge with different characteristics, i.e. different kinds of complementarities, 
different levels of complexity and tacit knowledge content, etc.   In turn, this 
implies that the costs and benefits of knowledge transfer differ depending on the 
sources of the knowledge being transferred.   
 Sidestepping  motivational  issues  for a moment, the success of knowledge 
transfer is primarily a matter of cognitive matters, such as the existence and 
richness of transmission channels (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989; Ghoshal, Korine 
and Szulanski 1994), the characteristics of the transferred knowledge in terms of 
such dimensions as tacitness and ambiguity (Zander and Kogut 1995; Szulanski 
1996), and the absorptive capacity of the target unit(s) (Gupta and Govindarajan 
2000).  We submit that these cognitive dimensions are systematically related to 
knowledge sources.  The further implication is that the costs and benefits of 
knowledge transfer and, therefore, the overall level of knowledge transfer, 
depend on knowledge sources.  
  More specifically, we argue that knowledge based on mainly internal 
knowledge is likely to be more easily transferable within the MNC than external 
knowledge.  Such knowledge is more likely to have many overlapping elements 
with other parts of the MNC knowledge structure than knowledge that is based 
on external knowledge sources.  Knowledge that is built on the basis of internal 
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knowledge inputs can be transmitted through existing channels and although it 
may contain, for example, tacit elements, the absorptive capacity of target units is 
likely to be high.  Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Subsidiary-level knowledge building that is mainly based on internal 
knowledge sources will be positively correlated with knowledge transfer from 
subsidiaries to other MNC units.   
  In contrast, subsidiary-level knowledge building that is based on external 
knowledge sources will result in knowledge that is of a more peripheral character 
and is likely to be less easily transferable to other MNC units.  This type of 
knowledge is, to a large extent, derived from the specific problems and needs of 
the external parties with which a subsidiary interacts, and/or consists of 
knowledge of local skill levels, tastes, regulatory authorities, etc., much of which 
may be hard to transfer or of little use for other MNC units.   In other words, the 
costs of transferring such knowledge may high, while the benefits may be low.  
Accordingly, we argue that the more a subsidiary is prone to accumulate external 
knowledge, the less knowledge will it transfer to other MNC units.  Given the 
above discussion, we can put forward the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: Subsidiary-level knowledge building that is mainly based on 
external knowledge will be negatively correlated with intra-MNC knowledge 
transfer. 
  A key point of the differentiated MNC literature is that important 
knowledge may develop in what we call the periphery of the MNC knowledge 
structure.  This may seem to contrast H2.  However, notice that in order for such 
knowledge to be transferable and combinable with complementary knowledge 
elements in other MNC units, it has to be interpreted and formulated in such a 
way that it will be accessible to other units.  Overlapping knowledge elements 
have to be present.  One way to accomplish this is to relate knowledge based on 
external knowledge sources to knowledge based on internal knowledge sources.   
For example, the former may be reformulated so that it is complementary to 
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knowledge elements held in other MNC units. This reasoning suggests the 
following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3: The interaction effect between knowledge based on internal 
knowledge and knowledge based on external knowledge sources is positively 
correlated with knowledge transfer from subsidiaries to other MNC units.  
As knowledge based on internal and external knowledge sources is associated 
with different costs of transfer and with different benefits (i.e., 
complementarities), we expect MNC management to try to influence the sources 
of knowledge that subsidiaries tap.  However, influencing these sources through, 
for example, location decisions, is not the only means of optimizing the 
accumulation and transfer of knowledge.  Management can also make use of 
organizational control and motivation mechanisms.  
Organizational Instruments and the Development of Knowledge in 
Subsidiaries 
  Many contributions to the MNC literature recognize that the process of 
knowledge transfer is likely to be supported by different organizational means of 
control and motivation (e.g., Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989; Gupta and Govindarajan 
1991, 1995; Buckley and Carter 1999). Indeed, a key theme is that 
interdependencies (complementarities) between knowledge flows strongly 
condition the choice of management systems and processes for managing 
subsidiary relations (e.g., Gupta and Govindarajan 1995). We add to these ideas in 
the following ways. First, the choice of organizational mechanisms of control and 
motivation also influence the process of building knowledge, not just the process 
of transferring it.  This is because the application of different mechanisms leads to 
different kinds of knowledge being built.  Second, causality may go in the reverse 
direction in the sense that the choice of organizational mechanisms of control and 
motivation also influence the transferability of knowledge.  These points are 
detailed in the following. 
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  Subsidiary autonomy and the process of knowledge building. The 
knowledge structure of the MNC contains shared elements as well as elements 
that are not shared but reside strictly within a given subsidiary.  The latter 
knowledge elements may include knowledge about local tastes, technologies, 
regulators, suppliers, etc. In order to efficiently utilize the local elements of 
knowledge, delegation of rights to make decisions that involve such local 
knowledge to those that best know how to turn the relevant knowledge to 
productive uses, namely local subsidiary management, will be necessary.  Along 
such lines, it can be argued that granting more decision rights to an MNC 
subsidiary, thereby giving it more autonomy, improves the incentives for the 
subsidiary to engage in the accumulation of local knowledge (cf. Aghion and 
Tirole 1997).  Local, subsidiary-specific knowledge is more likely to based on 
external knowledge, making it hard for MNC headquarters and top-management 
to direct the subsidiary’s acquisition of such knowledge because of the knowledge 
asymmetry (Jensen and Meckling 1992).  Thus, stimulating the development of 
external knowledge in a subsidiary - for example, in the hope of increasing local 
marketing and product development - may involve granting a high degree of 
autonomy to the subsidiary.  This leads to our fourth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4:   Subsidiary-level processes of building knowledge from external 
knowledge inputs are positively influenced by the degree of autonomy granted to 
the subsidiary. 
  Interdependencies and the process of knowledge building.  Subsidiary 
knowledge may also be built from internal knowledge inputs, such as knowledge 
produced through interaction with other MC units.   The emphasis is on building 
knowledge that is at least potentially transferable. The process of building 
knowledge in a subsidiary will, therefore, reflect perceived complementarities 
with knowledge elements in other parts of the MNC in order to realize potential 
benefits.  Thus, we put forward the following hypothesis:  
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Hypothesis 5:  Subsidiary-level processes of building knowledge from internal 
knowledge inputs are positively influenced by the perceived interdependencies 
(complementarities) between the focal subsidiary and other MNC units. 
Furthermore, the development of internal knowledge is likely to be stimulated by 
the transfer of goods and/or services between MNC units.  This is because the 
transfer, known as intra-MNC trade, is in itself a force pulling in the direction of a 
widening of communication channels. This prompts the discovery of new 
opportunities for realizing complementarities between knowledge components 
(Kirzner 1973). We put forward the following hypothesis on this basis:  
Hypothesis 6: Developing internal knowledge in MNC subsidiaries is positively 
influenced by the amount of trade between the focal subsidiary and other MNC 
units. 
The hypotheses are summarized in the following model. 
 
XXXXXX Insert Figure 2 here XXXXXX 
 
 
III. Data and Method 
Data Collection 
  The data for this paper was collected as part of the Centres of Excellence 
(CoE) project that engaged researchers in the Nordic countries, the United 
Kingdom, Germany, Austria, Italy, Portugal and Canada (see Holm and Pedersen 
2000a&b).  The CoE-project was launched in May 1996 with the purpose of 
investigating headquarter-subsidiary relationships and the internal flow of 
knowledge in MNCs. In order to collect comparable quantitative data on 
acquisition of subsidiary knowledge, it was decided to construct a questionnaire 
that could be applied in all the involved countries.  This was accomplished after 
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several project meetings and extensive reliability tests of the questionnaire on 
both academics and business managers.   
  For practical reasons, each project member was responsible for gathering 
data on foreign-owned subsidiaries within their own country. Thus, all 
subsidiaries in the database belong to MNCs. In the data gathering, subsidiary 
managers, rather than headquarters, were respondents. One advantage of 
choosing subsidiary respondents is that they are directly engaged in the market 
and are therefore more acquainted with its characteristics. Although we may 
expect any subsidiary to have a reliable awareness and understanding of its own 
knowledge elements, it would be an advantage to gather information on intra-
MNC knowledge flows from other corporate units as well. However, it would be 
an unmanageable task first to identify the subsidiaries in each country and then to 
identify the relevant management units in the foreign MNCs.   
  The paper is based on data from seven countries, namely Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Norway, Sweden and the UK. All countries are located in the 
northern part of Europe. The four Nordic countries are relatively small, while 
Germany and the UK are among the largest in Europe.  Approximately 80 percent 
of the questionnaires were answered by subsidiary executive officers, while 
financial managers, marketing managers or controllers in the subsidiary 
answered the remaining 20 per cent. The response rate varies between 20 (UK) 
and 55 percent (Sweden), depending on the country of investigation. The quality 
of the data is quite high, with a general level of missing values of not more than 
five percent.  
 XXXXXXXX Insert Table 1 Here  XXXXXXXX 
  As shown in Table 1, the total sample covers information on 2,107 
subsidiaries. It comprises all kinds of subsidiaries in all fields of business. The 
sample size ranges from 202 (UK) to 530 (Sweden), with the size of the sample 
being rather similar, with the exception of Sweden. The average number of 
employees in the subsidiaries is 742 and the median is 102. Within the five smaller 
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countries, the average size of the subsidiaries are very similar, while Germany 
and the UK, due to the larger size of their markets, comprise substantially larger 
subsidiaries.  As it seems natural to expect larger subsidiaries to comprise more 
knowledge elements and therefore more potential for knowledge transfer, ceteris 
paribus, we need to control for this bias in the data material when conducting tests 
of the above hypotheses.  
  For all subsidiaries sampled, information exists on the subsidiary knowledge 
elements, notably subsidiary level competencies, the sources of the competencies, 
organizational context variables, and the extent to which knowledge has been 
transferred to other MNC-units. The subsidiaries were asked to indicate the level 
of competence for six different activities performed by the subsidiary on a seven-
point Likert scale, from 1=very weak competence to 7=very strong competence. 
The relevant six activities are: research (basic and applied), development (of 
products and processes), production (of goods and services), marketing and sales, 
logistics and distribution, and purchasing. The average score on the seven-point 
scale of the level of competence is shown in Table 2.  
 XXXXXXXX Insert Table 2 HereXXXXXXXX 
In general, the subsidiaries indicate that they comprise a relatively high level of 
competence for all activities with average values ranging from 4 to 6 on the seven-
point scale. The pattern is very similar for all six countries, with the highest 
competence levels for production and marketing/sales, and somewhat lower 
levels for the four other activities. As expected, the larger German and UK 
subsidiaries have higher competence levels than the other subsidiaries in the 
sample, with slightly higher values than the total sample for all six activities.  
Measures 
  All data were collected through the questionnaire and most variables are 
multi-item measures that  were measured using seven-point Likert scales. 
However, items such as the number of employees were measured using actual 
     18  
values. The following sections provide the exact wording used for questionnaire 
items. 
  Knowledge transfer. Our definition of knowledge transfer captures the 
application rather than the transfer per se of the subsidiary knowledge in other 
MNC units. Accordingly, the subsidiaries were asked to what extent the 
knowledge they control has been of use to other MNC units. Respondents 
indicated this on a seven-point Likert scale, where 1 was defined as “to no use at 
all for other units” and 7 was defined as “very useful for other units” for all the 
six above-mentioned activities. Knowledge transfer is a multi-item construct 
calculated as the average score reported by respondents across these six items 
(Alpha=0.74). 
  Internal knowledge. The construct of “internal knowledge” (i.e., subsidiary-
level knowledge built mainly from internal knowledge inputs) captures both the 
subsidiaries’ own effort at producing knowledge and the knowledge developed 
through interaction with other MNC units. The subsidiaries’ own knowledge 
production was measured by asking respondents to assess the level of 
investments in the subsidiary in the past three years, where 1 equaled “very 
limited” and 7 equaled “substantial”. The level of investments was assessed for all 
the six above-mentioned activities. In order to measure the knowledge developed 
through interaction with other MNC units, the respondents were asked to assess 
the impact of various internal organizations on the development of the 
subsidiary's competencies, where 1 equaled “no impact at all” and 7 equaled 
“very decisive impact”. Three organizations were identified: internal MNC 
customers, internal MNC suppliers, and internal MNC R&D units. In the models 
used to test our hypotheses, we use a composite measure, Internal knowledge, 
based on the average across all nine items (Alpha=0.73). 
  External knowledge. The construct of “external knowledge” (i.e., 
subsidiary-level knowledge built mainly from external knowledge inputs) 
captures both the importance of external parties, such as customers and suppliers, 
and the local cluster as sources of knowledge development in the subsidiary. The 
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inputs from external partners were measured by asking respondents to assess the 
impact of various external organizations on the development of the subsidiary's 
competencies, where 1 equaled “no impact at all” and 7 equaled “very decisive 
impact”. Four organizations were identified: external market customers, external 
market suppliers, specific distributor and specific external R&D units. 
  Building on the elements of Porter's (1990) diamond model, respondents 
were asked to assess the business environment in which they compete along the 
following dimensions: availability of business professionals; availability of supply 
material; quality of suppliers; level of competition; government support; 
favorable legal environment; and existence of research institutions (1 equaled 
”very low” and 7 equaled “very high”). In the diamond model, the items are 
presented as different dimensions.  However, Porter's (1990) own emphasis on the 
holistic nature of the model and the high inter-correlation between many of the 
items motivated us to construct a composite index. External knowledge is calculated 
as the average score reported by respondents across these eleven items 
(Alpha=0.68).   
  Interdependence (Complementarity). This variable measures the extent to 
which MNC units are dependent on (other) subsidiaries and vice versa. The MNC 
dependence on the subsidiary knowledge was assessed by asking the respondents 
the following question: “What would be the consequences for other units in the 
Foreign Company if they no longer had access to the competencies of the 
subsidiary?”  (1 equaled “no consequences” and 7 equaled “very significant 
consequences”). In a similar vein, the subsidiary dependence on knowledge from 
other MNC units was captured by the following question: “What would be the 
consequences for the subsidiary if it no longer had access to the competencies of 
other MNC units?”  (1 equaled “no consequences” and 7 equaled “very significant 
consequences”). Taken together, these two items reflect the interdependence 
between the focal subsidiary and other MNC units.  
  Intra-MNC trade. The level of intra-MNC trade is an indicator of the 
breadth of the internal trade links. It is measured as a single item - the share of 
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subsidiary sale going to other MNC units in 1996. The subsidiary sale to other 
MNC units includes both semi-products and final goods and services. 
  Autonomy. Based on the scale developed by Roth and Morrison (1992), 
respondents were asked to identify the level at which certain decisions were 
made, where 1 equaled foreign corporate (HQ), 2 equaled sub-corporate (e.g. 
division), 3 equaled subsidiary level.  The decisions were as follows: hiring top 
subsidiary management; entering new markets within the country; entering 
foreign markets; changes to subsidiary organization; introduction of new 
products/services; approval of quarterly plan/schedules. Our measure, 
Autonomy, is based on the average of these six items (Alpha=0.61). 
  Controls. To control for structural characteristics of the subsidiary that 
might also influence the extent of knowledge transfer, we controlled for the 
following factors: number of subsidiary employees in 1996 (a proxy for size), its 
mode of formation (a dummy: greenfield or acquisition), and the host country of 
the subsidiary (six dummies: using UK as a base case). We expect that larger 
subsidiaries will be more likely to transfer knowledge to other MNC units, 
consistent with our theoretical arguments of a cumulative process of knowledge 
development in foreign subsidiaries. We have no predictions on the role of entry 
mode and the country dummies for the extent of knowledge transfer. 
  
IV. Results 
Tests of Hypotheses  
  The six hypotheses may be summarized in three basic models as follows.
  
1) Internal knowledge  =   Interdependencies + Intra-MNC trade + Error 
2) External knowledge   =   Autonomy + Error 
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3) Transfer of knowledge =   Internal knowledge + External knowledge + Internal 
knowledge*External knowledge + Controls + Error 
 
Hypotheses 1-3 are reflected in model 3, while hypothesis 4 is expressed in model 
2. Finally, hypotheses 5-6 are expressed in model 1. However, since the above 
models represent decisions that are interdependent (i.e., they have to be 
considered jointly), the use of single equation models may yield biased results 
and obscure interesting theoretical possibilities.  As the above models are 
interdependent, it is possible that the joint optimization of all involved decisions 
may lead to sub-optimization of one or more individual decisions. Statistically, 
the interdependence might be reflected in that error terms of the three models are 
somehow correlated. Hence, the correct model to estimate these decisions is a 
simultaneous equation model as three-stage least square, which circumvents the 
problem of interdependence by using instrument variables (often the exogenous 
variables) to obtain predicted values of the endogenous variables (in our case: 
knowledge transfer, internal knowledge, and external knowledge).  
The correlation coefficients and descriptive data (mean values and standard 
deviation, minimum and maximum values) on all exogenous variables are 
provided in Appendix 1. There is a very high correlation between the interaction 
term and the main effects of internal and external knowledge (0.92 and 0.66) as 
expected. However, none of the other correlation coefficients indicated the 
possibility of multicollinearity (i.e. r>0.5).  
  We have applied the three-stage least square regression techniques (3SLS) 
with instrument variables to test all six hypotheses simultaneously. All exogenous 
variables (interdependencies, intra-MNC trade, autonomy, subsidiary employees, 
mode of formation, and country dummies) are used as instrument variables in the 
estimation of the model. The result of the total model is reported in Table 3. 
Numbers in parentheses represent standard errors. 
XXXXXXXX  Insert Table 3 Here XXXXXXXX 
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  Overall, the system of the three equations (models) works well, with a 
system weighted R-square of 0.44.  This indicates that almost half of the observed 
variation in the extent of knowledge transfer is explained by the variables in the 
model.  We turn now to the tests of our explanatory hypotheses. 
  Starting with hypotheses 5 and 6, recall that they posited a relationship 
between the interdependence and intra-MNC trade and internal knowledge 
development. These hypotheses are tested in the first equation and they are 
strongly supported.  Both organizational variables have a significantly positive 
relationship with the development of internal knowledge (both at the one percent 
level).  Hypothesis 4, which suggested that subsidiary autonomy impacts the 
building of knowledge that is mainly based on external knowledge sources, is 
also supported with a significant positive relationship, albeit only at the five 
percent level. 
  Hypotheses 1-3, which together propose that the development of internal 
and external subsidiary knowledge facilitates the level of knowledge transfer, are 
tested in the third equation. All three hypotheses are supported, indicating that 
development of internal knowledge has a positive effect (at the one percent level), 
while the development of external knowledge has a direct negative impact (five 
percent level) on the transfer of knowledge to other MNC units. However, the 
interaction effect of internal knowledge and external knowledge has a strong 
positive (one percent level) relationship with the level of knowledge transfer. 
These results point to the conclusion that while internal knowledge has a direct 
and positive effect on knowledge transfer, the effect of external knowledge is 
more indirect, going through the interaction with internal knowledge.  This 
suggests that subsidiary knowledge built from external knowledge sources must 
somehow be integrated with internal knowledge before knowledge transfer takes 
place. 
  The number of subsidiary employees turns out to be insignificant, while 
acquisitions do transfer more knowledge than greenfields to other MNC units 
(formation is significant). Recall that the UK was used as a base case for the six 
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country dummies. Therefore, the country dummies shows that subsidiaries from 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden transfer significantly less knowledge to other 
MNC units than do the foreign owned subsidiaries hosted in the UK (and 
Finland, Germany, and Austria). This might be explained by the small size of the 
Scandinavian markets and their location on the European periphery.    
     
V. Concluding Discussion 
The present paper seeks to contribute to the recent differentiated MNC literature 
on intra-MNC knowledge transfer.  It goes beyond this literature in a number of 
ways. 
A major problem in the literature is that the main emphasis has been on 
inter-firm knowledge heterogeneity rather than on intra-firm knowledge 
heterogeneity. The reason for this is that much of the literature has focused on 
knowledge spillovers between independent firms and has compared different 
organizational forms in terms of their effectiveness at transferring knowledge.  It 
is symptomatic that the literature on managing knowledge in joint ventures and 
strategic alliances is larger than the literature on managing knowledge in the 
MNC.  However, the suppression of intra-firm knowledge heterogeneity makes it 
difficult to frame processes of intra-firm knowledge transfer (and other MNC 
learning processes as well).  In fact, the motive for knowledge transfer is usually 
the wish to somehow combine knowledge elements that have hitherto existed 
separately. The relation between the transferred knowledge elements and the 
existing stock of knowledge (the MNC knowledge structure) has implications for 
costs and benefits of knowledge transfer.  
Thus, we have made the argument that the understanding of knowledge 
transfer between MNC units will be furthered by taking starting with a 
conceptualization of the MNC as a knowledge structure. Such a conceptualization 
is not present in the extant literature. Therefore, there is no explicit, coherent view 
of what it means to say that the MNC is a knowledge-based entity.  While we 
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cannot claim to have produced such a view in the present paper, we have taken 
some steps towards what a knowledge structure view of the MNC may look like.  
The basis of our reasoning is the argument that in lieu of such a view, the 
understanding of MNC knowledge management processes will be incomplete.     
Adopting a knowledge structure view that portrays the MNC as a web of 
connected nodes brings the costs and benefits of knowledge management directly 
into focus.   
  We also noted that understanding MNC knowledge management implies 
taking knowledge processes (i.e., building and transferring knowledge) as 
endogenous to organizational instruments.  It was argued that MNC management 
might choose control variables (organizational instruments) to influence certain 
state variables (the creation and transfer of knowledge), with the existing MNC 
knowledge structure forming the starting point for such an exercise.   
  The analysis points to the realization of complementarities between 
transferred knowledge and existing knowledge as the main benefit of knowledge 
transfer, while the costs of knowledge transfer stem from costs of transfer (i.e., 
media of transfer) and costs of governing (i.e., providing motivation).  Therefore, 
the net benefits of knowledge transfer depend on the costs of governing and 
transfer in order to realize complementarities.  While the costs of knowledge 
transfer have been treated in the literature on MNC knowledge transfer as 
“stickiness of knowledge transfer”, the benefits have largely been ignored.  We 
have taken steps towards an analysis that places costs and benefits on an equal 
footing. 
  An important implication is that this framework allows more scope for 
managerial discretion in the intra-firm transfer of knowledge than often seen in 
the literature. Thus, management can do more than align organizational 
mechanisms so that knowledge is efficiently transferred. By choosing 
organizational instruments, the characteristics of knowledge that is built and 
transferred inside the MNC can be influenced.  In our operationalization of this 
approach to MNC knowledge management, we concentrated on how 
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management may influence key characteristics of the MNC knowledge structure.  
In particular, we focused on how MNC management may influence the sources of 
subsidiary knowledge by means of organizational instruments.  We largely found 
support for the main argument of the paper that MNC management, through 
choices regarding organizational control, motivation and context, can influence 
the development, characteristics and transfer of knowledge. Such organizational 
choice variables as the level of subsidiary autonomy (own decision-making), level 
of intra-MNC-trade, and interdependence among the subsidiary and other MNC 
units were all shown to have a bearing on the development of different sources of 
subsidiary knowledge. 
  Furthermore, sourcing knowledge mainly on an internal basis has a direct 
positive effect, while sourcing knowledge mainly on an external basis has a 
negative effect on subsidiary knowledge transfer. However, the indirect effect of 
externally sourced knowledge going through an interaction (and transformation) 
with internally sourcing knowledge also has a positive effect on subsidiary 
knowledge transfer. This indicates that to the extent that management chooses a 
specific way of sourcing knowledge, it also implicitly chooses the characteristics 
of the sourced knowledge and the ease with which it can be transferred inside the 
MNC. This is because knowledge from different knowledge sources has different 
characteristics and is thus transferred at different cost. 
  
  Finally, there are various problems with our approach that need to be briefly 
raised. The measures that indicate organizational means and context 
(interdependence, intra-MNC trade, autonomy) admittedly do so only rather 
imperfectly, and we would have preferred to have much more direct measures.  
For example, it is somewhat unclear what kind of organizational means or context 
the measure Intra-MNC Trade exactly represents.  However, these are 
unavoidable limitations of the dataset.   
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Table 1  Sample size and subsidiary employees in the different countries 
 
COUNTRY  SAMPLE SIZE  SUBSIDIARY EMPLOYEES (mean) 
Austria 313  318 
Denmark 308  284 
Finland 238  200 
Germany 254  1.574 
Norway 262  130 
Sweden 530  244 
UK 202  3.787 
Total 2.107  742 
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Table 2  Average competence level score on a seven-point scale 
 





Austria 3.1  4.4  5.8 6.1  5.7  5.2 
Denmark 4.8  5.2  6.0  5.9  5.7  5.3 
Finland 4.3  4.9  5.9  5.9  5.5  5.3 
Germany 4.6  5.3  6.3  6.2  5.9  5.7 
Norway 4.2  4.9  5.6  5.7  5.3  5.2 
Sweden 4.7  5.3  5.9  5.9  5.5  5.2 
UK 4.9  5.3  6.1  6.1  5.9  5.5 
Total 4.4  5.1  6.0  6.0  5.6  5.3 
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Table 3: The three-stage least squares estimation 









Intercept       2.38 
    (0.06)*** 
         3.71 
        (0.08)*** 
         1.29 
        (1.43) 
Interdependence       0.10 
    (0.02)*** 
  
Intra-MNC trade       0.08 
    (0.01)*** 
  
Autonomy        
     
         0.09 
        (0.04)** 
 
Internal knowledge             
         
         0.99 
        (0.24)*** 
External knowledge              -1.33 
        (0.56)** 
Internal knowledge* 
External knowledge 
             0.28 
        (0.01)*** 
Employees            0.00002 
     (0.00002) 
Formation              0.26 
       (0.06)*** 
Country dummies: 
-  Austria 
-  Denmark 
-  Finland 
-  Germany 
-  Norway 
-  Sweden 
   
   0.32  (0.24)  
  -0.39  (0.13)*** 
0.10 (0.18) 
0.20 (0.26) 
  -0.50  (0.11)*** 
  -0.49  (0.11)*** 
      F-value 
      R-square 
      N 
      90.61*** 
       
      2056 
        2.30** 
         
        2056 
       73.40*** 
        0.44 
        2056 
 
***, ** and * = significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. 
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  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  11  12  13  14  15 
 
1) Interdependence  1.00 
2) Intra-MNC-trade  0.30*** 1.00 
3) Autonomy  0.18*** 0.06  1.00 
4) Internal  knowledge  0.24*** 0.23*** -0.10*** 1.00 
5) External  knowledge  0.20*** 0.14*** 0.01  0.36*** 1.00 
6) Internal*External  knowl. 0.27*** 0.24*** -0.07***  0.92*** 0.66*** 1.00 
7) Employees  0.02  0.08*** 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 1.00 
8) Formation  -0.15***  0.08*** -0.12*** 0.11***  0.07***  0.11*** 0.03  1.00 
9) Austria    0.01  0.04*  0.11*** -0.12*** 0.07***  -0.06*** -0.01 -0.16***  1.00 
10)  Denmark  -0.03 0.05**  -0.03 0.03  0.02 0.03 -0.02  0.11***  -0.17***  1.00 
11)  Finland  -0.01 -0.07***  -0.02 -0.05**  0.03  -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.15***  -0.15***  1.00 
12) Germany  0.19***  0.14*** 0.01  0.12*** 0.21*** 0.18***  0.03 0.09 -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.13*** 1.00 
13) Norway  -0.15*** -0.13*** 0.01  -0.07*** -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.02  -0.07*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.13*** -0.14*** 1.00 
14) Sweden  -0.09*** -0.03  -0.03  0.03  -0.17*** -0.05**  -0.02  0.04*  -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.22*** 1.00 
15) UK  0.05**  0.01  -0.05**  0.08***  -0.02  0.05** 0.08***  -0.01  -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.19**  1.00 
 
Means  3.88 2.50 1.97 2.96 3.88 11.8 742  0.58 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.25 0.10 
 









   